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 Introductory Remarks 
 As a specifi c domain of  inquiry, “Buddhist epistemology” (sometimes designated in the 
specialist literature by the Sanskrit neologism  pram āṇ av ā da , or the “theory of  reliable 
sources of  knowledge”) stands primarily for the dialogical-disputational context in 
which Buddhists advance their empirical claims to knowledge and articulate the prin-
ciples of  reason on the basis of  which such claims may be defended. The main questions 
that we shall pursue here concern the tension between the notion that knowledge 
is ultimately a matter of  direct experience – which the Buddhist considers as more 
normative than other, more indirect, modes of  knowing – and the largely discursive 
and argumentative ways in which such experiential claims are advanced. 
 The Sanskrit philosophical idiom, in which Buddhist epistemology fi nds its fi rst and 
perhaps most elaborate expression, contains one distinctive term,  anubhava , for the 
concept of  “experience” and several terms that closely approximate the concept of  
“reason.” For instance,  tarka captures the notion of  speculative or logical inquiry;  nyā ya
stands for the notion of  rule or method for investigating objects by reliable means;  yukti
for the notion of  ground, proof, or motive, or for something that is right, fi t, or appropri-
ate; and  hetu for the notion of  means by which what was hitherto unproved is now 
proven. From this cursory terminological survey one may hastily conclude that, 
whereas the epistemic notion of  experience is universal, reason and the corresponding 
notion of  rationality (with their roots in the Latin  ratio , which conveys the sense of  
“reckoning” or “giving an account of  judgment,” as one might do in court) as a distinc-
tive epistemic faculty or process is not. Of  course, this observation assumes a Western 
frame of  reference for examining the relation between reason and experience. An alter-
native project would be to explore the relation between experience and whatever it is 
that Buddhists mean when they examine, refl ect upon, or seek to prove a given thesis 
without any reference to Western concepts and ways of  thinking. Given that this second 
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project is well nigh impossible if  carried out in a language such as English, whose philo-
sophical vocabulary has been shaped by a longstanding tradition of  Western thought, 
we face a dilemma: can Buddhist philosophy be written in English without losing the 
explanatory force of  its original concepts and categories? 
 Perhaps setting the problem in terms that are alien to the ways in which the 
Buddhists have pursued their epistemological refl ections showcases a limitation that 
the tradition in fact does not possess. Since analyses of  experience, argumentation, and 
debate are ubiquitous features of  Buddhist thought – barring all caveats about translat-
ability – it should be possible to offer an account of  the role that reason and experience 
play in Buddhist epistemology that is neither inauthentic nor mere reportage. It may 
also be the case that this distinction between reason and experience is too sharply 
drawn, and that there are ways of  conceiving of  what it is like to perceive and refl ect 
that regard them as complementary rather than opposite practices. Indeed, the recent 
recognition that the exercise of  reason varies both over history and across cultures (see 
Weinberg et al.  2001 ; Machery et al.  2004 ; Huebner et al.  2010 ) should suffi ce to call 
into question any attempt to see both practical and theoretical reason as removed from 
the embodied patterns of  conduct that characterize our specifi c ways of  being in the 
world. As will be argued at length in this chapter, epistemological inquiries in India, 
particularly with regard to examining the sources of  reliable cognition, have never 
displayed the sort of  non-naturalism distinctive to the Cartesian and Kantian traditions 
in Western philosophy and their characteristically abstract epistemic notions of  experi-
ence and rationality. Thus, with the return to naturalism in epistemology, hence to 
understanding cognition in embodied and causal terms, we may now be in a better 
position to appreciate the contributions of  Buddhist philosophers to epistemology. 
 This chapter explores how the relation between direct experience and discursive 
modes of  knowing is articulated in Indian Buddhism. The fi rst account of  this relation, 
as is well known, originates with Siddh ā rtha Gautama ’ s experience of  enlightenment. 
This experience becomes at once the source of  the Buddhist metaphysical picture of  
reality and the culmination of  all aspiration for genuine knowledge (the kind that 
guarantees the successful accomplishment of  such practical ends as freedom from suf-
fering). Key to this metaphysical picture is the causal principle of  dependent arising and 
a thoroughly psychological account of  persons, which takes experience and rational 
deliberation to be but two of  the many contributing factors that shape human identity 
and agency. Indeed, at the foundation of  this Buddhist inquiry into the sources of  
knowledge is the notion that awakened knowledge has existential consequences, and 
can effect the removal not only of  such affl ictions as ignorance and deception but also 
of  the reifying tendencies inherent in common-sense beliefs. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that epistemological inquiry is central to Buddhist philosophy, and that under-
standing the nature of  knowledge, its sources, and its conditions of  possibility are 
constitutive of  its main thrust. 
 We will start with a brief  overview of  canonical and Abhidharma perspectives on 
the scope of  epistemological refl ection, then evaluate the well-known Madhyamaka 
skepticism about the possibility of  conceptually articulating our specifi c modes of  being 
in the world, and conclude with an examination of  Dign ā ga and Dharmak ī rti ’ s accounts 
of  the relation between observation and inferential reasoning. Lastly, given the modern 
audience for this essay (and, indeed, for this volume), adopting a constructive, rather 
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than merely critical and exegetical approach seems not only appropriate but also timely. 
If  our efforts to reclaim the legacy of  non-Western traditions of  philosophical inquiry 
are to have more than a historical or broadly exegetical value (and thus appeal to those 
outside Buddhist scholarly circles) we must necessarily consider whether Buddhist 
epistemology can provide a basis for analytic and constructive engagements of  the sort 
typically found in contemporary philosophical debates. 
 Doubting, Knowing, and Seeing 
 In one of  his best-known discourses, the Buddha endorses doubt as a legitimate epis-
temic attitude, telling his disciples that it is fi tting to doubt and be perplexed. Enjoining 
his followers not to accept oral and scriptural tradition, but to rely on personal experi-
ence and discernment, the Buddha appears to challenge even such widely accepted 
modes of  inquiry as logical and inferential reasoning: “Do not go by . . .  logical reason-
ing, by inferential reasoning, by consideration of  reasons, by the refl ective acceptance 
of  a view” ( Kā l ā ma Sutta ). Rather, the Buddha urges, one is to discriminate between 
wholesome and unwholesome states of  mind and use that discrimination as a guide to 
undertaking only those particular tasks, and following only those specifi c practices, 
that are conducive to welfare and happiness. It is nonetheless obvious that, despite such 
apparent disclaimers of  reason, an endorsement of  the notion that liberating insight 
demands careful empirical scrutiny can be clearly gleaned from the canonical litera-
ture. Furthermore, the knowledge one gains from such scrutiny must be ascertained 
on the basis of  its effectiveness in removing both affl ictive and cognitive obscurations, 
as well as in overcoming the kind of  hindrances typically associated with conditioned 
phenomena. This emphasis on direct experience as a preferred mode of  knowing is one 
of  the reasons why some authors have interpreted the quest for truth in early Buddhism 
as akin to Western forms of  empiricism, even though the Buddhist operates with a 
wider notion of  “experience” than empiricist accounts of  knowledge (as derived solely 
from sense experience) would allow. Thus, contrary to what might seem from afar like 
a Buddhist endorsement of  misology, canonical sources make quite clear that several 
distinct factors play a crucial role in the acquisition of  knowledge. These are variously 
identifi ed with the testimony of  sense experience, introspective or intuitive experience, 
inferences drawn from these two types of  experience, and some form of  coherentism, 
which demands that truth claims remain consistent across the entire corpus of  doc-
trine. Thus, to the extent that Buddhists employ reason, they do so primarily in order 
further to advance the empirical investigation of  phenomena. It is principally for this 
reason that early Buddhism presents us with a causal account of  cognition and takes 
theories of  causation to play a central role in any theory of  knowledge. As K. N. Jaya-
tilleke, one of  the fi rst proponents of  a Buddhist sort of  empiricism, notes, “inductive 
inferences in Buddhism are based on a theory of  causation. These inferences are made 
on the data of  perception . . .  What is considered to constitute knowledge are direct 
inferences made on the basis of  such perceptions” (Jayatilleke  1963 , 457). 
 But there are matters that are simply not amenable to rational inquiry (and justifi ca-
tion), and cannot be offered the sort of  categorical answer one would expect of  more 
straightforward issues such as the difference between true and false belief  or between 
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wholesome and unwholesome mental and affective states. Perhaps the best-known 
examples of  such matters are the so-called unexplained or undetermined ( avy ā kṛ ta ) 
questions: whether the self  and the world are eternal or not, whether they are fi nite or 
infi nite, whether the soul and the body are identical or different, and whether one who 
has thus gone or come (a  tathā gata : one who has realized that the real nature of  things 
is just “thus,” free from any conceptual imputations) continues, does not continue, both 
continues and does not continue, or neither continues nor does not continue to exist 
after death. Modern scholars have proposed different interpretations of  the Buddha ’ s 
apparent non-committal on these crucial metaphysical and epistemological questions. 
Some claim a philosophical basis for the Buddha ’ s silence, asserting either that he 
wished to leave the matter open for further inquiry and debate or that he did have 
answers but refused to reveal them as a deterrent to those seeking to make progress 
along the path. The canonical literature makes amply obvious that those who are able 
to follow in the Buddha ’ s footsteps will likewise come to realize that all views are merely 
conventions established upon common practice, and, as a result, will forgo all philo-
sophical disputation: the adept “agrees with no-one, disputes with no-one, and makes 
use of  philosophical terms without erring” ( Dī ghanakha Sutta ). 
 We can easily recognize in one of  these questions the well-known mind–body 
problem. Are we to conclude that the Buddha does not consider this to be a real pro-
blem, deserving of  a careful and measured answer? Or, is it rather the case that our 
conceptual resources are simply inadequate and cannot provide an answer to these 
questions in unambiguous and uncontroversial terms? If  the knowledge project in Bud-
dhism is about overcoming adherence to mistaken views, then it may well be the case 
that these questions are simply verbally and conceptually ill-formed, typical examples 
of  pointless speculation (cf. Collins  1982 , 132). Phenomena, including the fi ve aggre-
gates that are constitutive of  human existence and/or experience (form, feeling, apper-
ception, dispositions, and consciousness), come together as a product of  multiple causes 
and conditions and cease with the removal of  these causal and conditioning factors. 
None of  these elements and factors in the web of  interdependent arising, however, has 
causal priority. Any attempt to understand them in terms of  permanence or complete 
dissolution disregards the fundamental causal principle of  dependent arising, and 
therefore is not worthy of  serious consideration. 
 Abhidharma traditions – essentially comprising a large body of  literature concerned 
with examining the received teachings that emerged roughly three centuries after the 
death of  the Buddha – do concede that there are specifi c principles of  reason for why 
causal chains display patterns of  regularity. But even here the assumption is that the 
descriptive framework of  analysis is intended to serve not as a complete metaphysical 
picture of  reality, but as a primer for identifying those elements (thoughts, desires, 
habitual tendencies) that are unwholesome, with the ultimate aim of  overcoming 
them. The goal is thus pragmatic rather than speculative: unwholesome thoughts and 
desires must be properly identifi ed and eradicated if  liberation from suffering is to be 
achieved. Attempts to identify specifi c principles of  reason, and indeed to employ them 
for the purpose of  achieving greater clarity about controversial issues, become formal-
ized in such representative works as the  Points of  Controversy ( Kath ā vatthu ), where we 
come across issues of  doctrinal confl ict that warrant serious critical discussion and 
debate. Whether works such as the  Points of  Controversy anticipate something like a 
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logical system of  deductive principles and propositional laws, as early interpreters have 
claimed (Aung and Rhys Davids  1915 ; Schayer  2001 [1933] ; Bochenski  1961 ; and 
Matilal  1998 ), is less signifi cant for our purpose here than their pragmatic valuation 
of  rational modes of  inquiry. 
 It is true that, in terms of  both structure and strategy, these methods aim to codify 
specifi c rules of  debate, by means of  which controversial issues can be addressed and 
arguments (adduced by both parties) properly weighed and considered. Typically, the 
debate revolves around such issues as whether all knowledge is analytic, whether one 
can know the minds of  others, whether sensations follow one another continuously, 
and whether continuity of  awareness is genuinely achieved only in meditative equi-
poise. These debates, which involve a back-and-forth exchange concerning statements 
of  the sort “Is  a b ? (“Is knowledge analytic?”), most certainly appeal to principles that 
are discerningly like forms of  material implication, contraposition, and some version 
of   reductio ad absurdum . We may thus recognize these philosophically non-eristic dia-
logues as “reasoned examinations” ( yukti ) of  controversial points. 
 The pattern of  argumentation at work in  Points of  Controversy , as Jonardon Ganeri 
has convincingly shown, is presumptive rather than demonstrative, since the burden 
of  proof  switches from one party to the next, neither of  which offers any positive thesis 
(Ganeri  2001 , 487). It is precisely this preference for  argumentum ad ignorantiam (of  the 
sort: “I am right because not proven wrong”) that gains prestige with N ā g ā rjuna ’ s 
development of  the radical thesis that it is not just that some controversial (or diffi cult) 
issues must be rigorously debated, but rather that reality itself  in some sense is beyond 
the reach of  conception. N ā g ā rjuna ’ s skepticism about the possibility of  positive argu-
mentation hinges on a crucial insight: that our ordinary ways of  conceiving – which 
depend on such standard concepts and categories as origin, motion, sensation, physical 
objects and their properties, past, present, and future, and the idea that objects in the 
class of  what J. L. Austin calls “medium-sized dry goods” have a self-standing nature 
or essence – are seriously fl awed. That is, they are the result of  a pervasive and systemic 
ignorance that affl icts the unenlightened human condition. 
 Before we turn briefl y to consider N ā g ā rjuna ’ s challenge to rationality as a method 
for establishing positive views, and its implications for Buddhist epistemology, let us fi rst 
consider the causal aspects of  the principles of  reason formulated by Abhidharma 
philosophers. 
 In the context of  addressing such basic doctrinal issues as the nature and scope of  
Buddhist teachings, Asa ṅ ga, for instance, identifi es four widely shared “reasons” ( yukti ) 
for which one may proceed to inquire into the nature of  things. The assumption is that 
such inquiries are indispensable for all who seek knowledge, however it may be defi ned. 
The issue under debate is not whether the desire to know itself  needs to be called into 
question – presumably by those who might see it as an affl iction, and thus doubt its 
inherently positive value – but how one who has realized that there are good and 
perhaps many reasons to examine things is to carry out such examinations. In the 
Collection on Higher Knowledge ( Abhidharmasamuccaya II) (see Tatia  1976 ), Asa ṅ ga lists 
four such reasons. First, there is the principle of  dependence ( apek ṣā yukti ), which takes 
into account the fact that conditioned things necessarily arise in dependence upon 
conditions: it is a principle of  reason, for instance, that sprouts depend on seeds. Second, 
there is the principle of  causal effi cacy ( kā ryak ā ra ṇ ayukti ), which accounts for the 
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difference between things in terms of  the different causal conditions for their apprehen-
sion: it is a principle of  reason, thus, that, in dependence upon form, a faculty of  vision, 
and visual awareness, one has visual rather than, say, auditory or tactile experiences 
(of  course, the phenomenon of  synesthesia, which Buddhist philosophers did not con-
sider, poses a challenge to this principle). The requirement that any sort of  instruction 
about what must be established as a matter of  principle is not contrary to the means 
by which it can be established captures the sense of  the third principle of  reason: the 
realization of  evidence from experience ( sā k ṣā tkriy ā s ā dhanayukti ). We realize the pres-
ence of  water from moisture and of  fi re from smoke. Lastly, there is the principle of  
natural reasoning, or the principle of  reality ( dharmat ā yukti ), which concerns the phe-
nomenal character of  things as perceived (for instance, the wetness and fl uidity of  
water). These four principles of  reason become a near permanent fi xture with later 
Indian Buddhist philosophers, and come close to embodying internalist and externalist 
accounts of  rationality for the purpose of  justifying certain claims to knowledge (or 
for appealing to causal explanation). That is, the principles of  reason ( yukti ) capture 
both the notion of  “her reason for doing  x ” and “the reason  x happened” (cf. Kapstein 
 1988 , 153). 
 This account of  the principles of  reason could be read in at least two ways: fi rst, as 
a causal theory of  natural fi tness, which would postulate that the world is such that it 
is reasonable to assert that things arise due to specifi c causes and conditions (for 
instance, that sprouts come from seeds). Such a theory would share common ground 
with views expressed by Sanskrit grammarians such as Bhart ṛ hari, who claim that the 
manner in which words are capable of  capturing objects in the empirical domain – such 
that the thing cognized is in some sense indistinguishable from the word (or expression) 
by which it is thus cognized – refl ects the latter ’ s natural fi tness (cf. Iyer  1969 , 204). 
Second, we may understand this account in Kantian terms as describing the  a priori
conditions for knowledge, since it is reasonable to assume that causal laws justify claims 
about the order of  the objective and subjective domains of  experience. 
 What we have here are examples of  natural reasoning or of  reasoning from experi-
ence, rather than attempts to use deliberative modes of  reasoning for the purpose of  
justifying a given thesis or arguing for its conditions of  satisfaction. With Dign ā  ga and 
Dharmak ī rti, such uses of  reason, as we shall argue below, develop in what may be best 
described as a system of  pragmatic or context-based reasoning. 
 Emptiness, Rationality, and the Impossibility of  Proof  
 The expansive taxonomies of  Abhidharma traditions, and their long and detailed lists 
of  the elements of  existence and/or experience ( dharmas ), stand as testimony to the 
central role that descriptive accounts of  experience play in the Buddhist epistemological 
project. But these descriptive accounts rely on observation, and observation leads to the 
old philosophical problem of  the difference between “seeing” and “seeing as.” Recent 
developments in epistemology, in particular those centered around the project of  natu-
ralism, have challenged the empiricist claim that observation is in some sense a type of  
“seeing” that is always dissociated from “seeing as.” As Jerry Fodor, for instance, puts 
it, letting psychology settle what an observation is, or just letting the observations be 
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the data, is legitimate; but “it ’ s sheer Empiricist dogmatism to take it for granted that 
you can do both at once. In fact, there is no good reason to suppose that the psychologi-
cal notion of  perception – or, indeed,  any psychological notion – will reconstruct the 
epistemological notion of  a datum” (Fodor  1991 , 200). 
 For the Buddhist epistemologists, however, this distinction between “seeing” and 
“seeing as” is instrumental in discriminating conception-free from conception-laden 
cognitive states, and, indeed, for claiming that only the former warrant the proper label 
of  veridical perception. Typically, the Buddhist points to such examples as being able to 
attend to perceptual input while thinking of  something else, as proof  that there is an 
epistemic gap between direct observation and perceptual judgment. It is this distinction 
that philosophers such as N ā g ā rjuna and Candrak ī rti challenge, and those such as 
Dignā ga and Dharmak ī rti defend as normative for any epistemological project. To 
say that there is a way that things are that is separate from how they show up to us, 
and that it is possible to have something like a pure, undiscriminating awareness of  
phenomena that is implicitly (thought non-discursively) cognitive, is to endorse the 
view that reality is in effect accessible to thought. The Buddhist epistemologists are not 
unaware that our cognitive capacities are constrained in some aspects. However, their 
emphasis is not on the internal and external constraints imposed upon our cognitive 
systems, but on what can be known and by what means. For N ā g ā rjuna, though, it is 
not just that some aspects of  reality might escape our discerning capacities, but rather 
that reality itself  is beyond the reach of  thought. As he famously puts it in his  Stanzas
on the Middle Way ( Mū lamadhyamakak ā rik ā ):
 Where the reach of  thought turns back, language turns back. The nature of  things is, like 
complete cessation, without origin and without decay. 
 (MMK.18.7) 
 For that reason, namely that the truth is deep and diffi cult to understand, the Buddha ’ s 
mind despaired of  being able to teach it. 
 (MMK.24.12) 
 Though at fi rst glance this position might be suggestive of  skepticism, it has elicited 
a wide range of  interpretations (some reiterating criticism leveled against N ā g ā rjuna 
by his historical rivals, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, and some refl ecting novel 
and constructive engagements with his philosophy). His position has been variously 
described as skepticism, nihilism, irrationalism, misology, agnosticism, criticism, dia-
lectic, mysticism, acosmism, absolutism, nominalism, relativism, Wittgenstenian lin-
guistic analysis, philosophical therapy, anti-realism, and deconstructionism, and as 
articulating a version of  paraconsistent logic (see Ruegg  1981 ; Siderits  1988 ; Hunt-
ington  2007 ; and Garfi eld  2008 ). As these widely divergent readings suggest, the 
exegetical question about how best to interpret N ā g ā rjuna ’ s Madhyamaka is yet to be 
settled. What is indisputable, however, is N ā g ā rjuna ’ s unambiguous stance  vis-à-vis
reliance on the common-sense conceptual schema that takes the world to be consti-
tuted of  enduring, self-sustaining objects. 
 For the purpose of  our analysis, N ā g ā rjuna appears to raise serious concerns not 
only about the very notion that there is such a faculty as reason, one attributable to a 
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stable and enduring agent, but also about what it is like to be undergoing an experience. 
Indeed, his dialectical stance calls into question the very notion that our modes of  being 
in the world (and the activities we typically associate with what it is like to see, hear, or 
verbally comprehend) have something like an inherent existence or character or their 
own (a  svabh ā va ). The Madhyamaka dialectical project is thus anchored in a decon-
structive analysis of  key concepts such as causation, essence, and the self. But, for this 
deconstructive analysis to be effective, N ā g ā rjuna needs to establish the view of  uni-
versal emptiness and supply arguments in defense of  such a view. 
 Now, N ā g ā rjuna does discuss the four modes or sources of  knowledge admitted by 
the Naiy ā yikas (perception, inference, cognition of  similarity, and verbal testimony), 
but it seems he is reluctant to commit to the view that such modes of  knowing consti-
tute effective epistemic guides. That is, while he recognizes that, say, objects in the 
empirical domain are established in dependence upon perception, he is less disposed to 
credit perception with the capacity to disclose entities as ultimately lacking inherent 
existence. Perception, at best, may be able to establish that objects exist as they appear 
(though, given the possibility of  perceptual illusion, it cannot establish that what has 
thus appeared has its conditions of  ascertainment intrinsically). That is, perception 
cannot establish by itself  whether its contents are veridical or not. 
 What, then, are some of  the ways in which we may explain what our modes of  
knowing can, if  at all, accomplish? Addressing this issue with respect to N ā g ā rjuna ’ s 
account, Jan Westerhoff  identifi es at least three such ways: (1) establishment by mutual 
coherence; (2) self-establishment; and (3) mutual establishment (Westerhoff   2009 , 
166). In the fi rst instance, the testimony of  experience is corroborated by other means, 
such as inference. I know that my perception of  a blue sky is non-deceptive because I 
can infer its presence from the absence of  clouds or the presence of  the sun ’ s warm 
radiance (given causal relations, or relations of  entailment between clouds, sky, and 
sunlight). Second, it may be that perceptions are in some sense self-revealing. In per-
ceiving I am aware not merely of  the object, in this case of  the blue sky, but also of  my 
act of  perceiving. This view of  perception relies on the notion that there is something 
it is like to see that requires no further corroboration. Finally, it may be the case that 
perception and object perceived are mutually established: vision discloses a world of  
visible objects, touch a world of  textures, and so on. 
 Most of  N ā g ā rjuna ’ s efforts are aimed at refuting the self-establishment thesis 
(though he also briefl y considers, and rejects, the mutual coherence thesis) and at 
justifying the mutual establishment thesis. For N ā g ā rjuna ’ s opponents, chiefl y the 
Naiyā yikas, the sources of  knowledge cooperate in disclosing a world of  self-standing, 
enduring objects, something that, of  course, is antithetical to the emptiness thesis. 
Taking fi re, and its capacity to illuminate, as a metaphor for the revealing nature of  
cognition, N ā g ā rjuna advances the thesis that phenomena of  this sort cannot be estab-
lished either by perception or by inference. To claim that cognitions are intrinsically 
self-revealing (just as fi re is inherently self-illuminating) is effectively to say that every-
thing knowable is established by some source of  knowledge: visible objects are estab-
lished as such by a faculty of  vision. At least in the case of  empirical awareness, to know 
something is to bring it forth and make it manifest to conscious awareness. But 
Nā g ā rjuna is not content merely to refute the thesis that, like fi re, a mode of  knowing, 
such as perception, discloses both itself  and other objects. Rather, he deploys his 
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dialectical method to argue that, in effect, a mode of  knowing discloses neither itself  
nor other objects (a double refutation of  the opponent ’ s thesis). It is here that 
Nā g ā rjuna ’ s conceptual schema, which places objects in mutually exclusive classes, 
leads to an epistemological impasse: that is, he presents us with an analysis of  experi-
ence that ignores the difference between what one might deem to be case (on the basis 
of  assumptions about the nature of  experience) and what seems actually to be the case 
in the occurrence of  a perceptual event:
 A lamp cannot illuminate when it is connected with darkness since their connection does 
not exist. Why are the lamp and darkness not connected? Because they are opposed. Where 
the lamp is, darkness is not. How can the lamp remove or illuminate darkness? 
 ( Auto-Commentary to Refutation of  Logic ( Vaidalyaprakara ṇ a-Svav ṛ tti ), 
24.2–8; in Tola and Dragonetti  1995 ) 
 In postulating darkness as something that has the power to conceal, N ā g ā rjuna in effect 
appears to reify a phenomenon that is established only negatively: darkness is not 
something that can be defi ned as the possessor of  some (concealing) capacity in the 
same way that light is defi ned by its capacity to illuminate. The phenomenological 
picture at work here is somewhat inadequate, given that it contains a description of  
darkness that assumes its discrete existence. Thus, N ā g ā rjuna ’ s refutation of  the capac-
ity of  light to illuminate (or, by analogy, of  perception to reveal) is problematic, since 
light and darkness are not independent objects but phenomena within the horizon of  
intentional awareness. The mutual exclusion of  light and darkness, however, is used 
here not simply to justify the impossibility of  light to illuminate what was hitherto 
concealed; rather, the argument is intended to demonstrate that fi re cannot be self-
established as a source of  illumination for other objects (presumably because it is 
itself  dependent on other things, such as fuel). Such self-establishment of  illumination 
in its dual role would require that light and object illuminated stand in a relation of  
causality. Though N ā g ā rjuna does admit that darkness is merely the absence of  light, 
he nonetheless appears to argue that absence itself  has some kind of  positive existence 
(which perforce prevents it from entering into any causal relationship with light, its 
opposite).
 Against the self-illumination theorist, who postulates that our modes of  knowing 
have a revealing character, the M ā dhyamika advances the argument that no mode of  
knowing has its characteristics intrinsically. Just as a knife cannot cut itself, so also any 
given mode of  knowing cannot know itself  in the process of  revealing an object. Two 
principles seem to underlie the M ā dhyamika ’ s argument: (i) the anti-refl exivity princi-
ple, which postulates that vision does not see itself; and (ii) the doctrine of  emptiness, 
which postulates that vision lacks intrinsic existence (viz.,  seeing ) (cf. Siderits  2003 , 32). 
The argument goes as follows: if  seeing is the intrinsic nature of  vision, then vision 
must have seeing intrinsically. Thus, vision must see even in the absence of  a visible 
object, because seeing would otherwise be dependent on external visible objects. But 
seeing (by defi nition) requires that there is something that is seen. Hence, in the absence 
of  a visible object, vision itself  is what vision sees. But vision cannot see itself  (as per 
the anti-refl exivity principle). Hence, seeing is not the intrinsic nature of  vision. Conclu-
sion: it is not true that vision sees visible objects. 
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 What, then, is it like to have veridical visual experiences, and how might one mean-
ingfully articulate their epistemic status? Neither N ā g ā rjuna nor his followers offer us 
a positive answer. For these Buddhist philosophers of  the Middle Way, the true nature 
of  reality is such that it is beyond the limits of  thought. But we may ask: is it also beyond 
the reach of  experience? And, if  it is, by what means may this thesis be ascertained? It 
is worth noting that N ā g ā rjuna ’ s categorical stance on the limits of  knowledge is decid-
edly different from such paradoxical inquiry into the possibility of  knowledge one comes 
across, for instance, in Plato ’ s  Meno (80d-e). We are dealing here not with the impos-
sibility of  inquiring into that which we do not know, but with the impossibility of  
reaching beyond what inquiry itself  can deliver. What we have here is a rejection of  the 
notion that (ultimate) reality can form an object of  rational inquiry. 
 Not all followers of  N ā g ā rjuna are satisfi ed with his uncompromising stance about 
the possibility of  making assertions about the ultimate nature of  reality. As Bh ā viveka 
(who takes seriously the virtues of  positive argumentation in discriminating between 
true and false beliefs) claims,  there is something it is like to see the nature of  reality, even 
though only buddhas have such abilities: “Buddhas, without seeing, see all objects of  
knowledge just as they are, with minds like space and with nonconceptual knowledge” 
(Verses on the Heart of  the Middle Way ( Madhyamakah ṛ dayak ā rik ā ), 5.106; in Eckel  2008 ). 
The terminology used here includes terms such as  ā loka (light) and  locana (illuminat-
ing), both of  which convey the sense of  vision as having a revealing and disclosing 
capacity. For the ordinary individual, the clouds that obscure their vision exist only in 
their minds, since reality is as clear as the autumn sky. Even the experience of  enlight-
enment itself  is in some sense associated with a specifi c type of  vision that is effortless 
in revealing the nature of  reality. Such reality cannot be merely the postulate of  reason. 
But Bh ā viveka is not only willing to rehabilitate empirical awareness; he also comes 
to the rescue of  reason (even though he admits that inferential knowledge does not 
possess the kind of  vividness that alone qualifi es direct experience as a true source 
of  knowledge): “It is impossible to understand reality as an object of  inference, but 
inference can rule out the opposite of  the knowledge of  reality” (ibid., 5.107). It is this 
rehabilitation of  a reason that is fi rmly grounded in experience that informs the spartan 
epistemology of  Dign ā ga and Dharmak ī rti, who, as will be examined below, will come 
to recognize that epistemological inquiries cannot be properly undertaken (or disputes 
settled) without taking into account that cognitive events are grounded in all aspects 
of  an individual ’ s conscious experience. 
 Cognitive Events, Logical Reasons, and Causal Explanation 
 That reason may be more readily (and effectively) deployed to exclude unwarranted 
beliefs, rather than to make warranted assertions, marks an important shift in attitude 
towards the role of  rational inquiry. Indeed, the development of  Buddhist epistemology 
as a distinct type of  discourse is marked by the gradual acceptance of  certain canons 
of  logic and argumentation by those Buddhist philosophers who would come to regard 
polemical engagement with their Brahmanical opponents as vital to infl uencing their 
standing in a wider philosophical community. But there are more than simply sociologi-
cal reasons at work in this novel orientation towards the scope of  rational inquiry. We 
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may see this engagement as refl ecting a certain eagerness on the part of  (at least) some 
Buddhists to guarantee that their modes of  argumentation are commensurable with 
the widely accepted methods of  reasoning formulated by the Naiy ā yikas. What seems 
to concern philosophers such as Dign ā ga, Dharmak ī rti, and their successors is precisely 
this need to withstand the criticism that core doctrinal principles such as those of  
momentariness and dependent arising can neither be defended on rational grounds nor 
fi nd any sort of  empirical support. 
 Debates about the proper way to conduct epistemic inquiries, and about the kind of  
sources that can provide evidential ground for knowledge, form an integral part of  the 
Indian philosophical traditions. Though there is no universal agreement on what 
should count as an “accredited” source of  knowledge, perception is often singled out as 
the exception: most philosophers agree that the testimony of  direct experience ought 
to play a central role in any theory of  knowledge. For inference and verbal testimony to 
play the sort of  epistemic role that is typically attributed to them, the content of  one ’ s 
mental states (or propositional attitudes) must be grounded in veridical experiences. 
Indeed, what use would inference have if, in trying to infer the presence of  fi re from an 
observation of  smoke, one were to mistake dust (or mist) for smoke? But grounding 
knowledge on a foundation of  empirical experience is not without its challenges: per-
ceptual ambiguities are often experienced even under the best conditions of  observa-
tion, and there is always the possibility of  less than optimal perceptual functioning. 
 How, then, do the Buddhist epistemologists resolve the tension between experience 
and reasoning? In the fi rst instance, they take perception to function not only as a 
psychological process, to be understood within the framework of  classical Abhidharma 
phenomenology, but also as an epistemic modality for establishing a cognitive event as 
knowledge. Secondly, they do not make a radical distinction between epistemology and 
the psychological processes of  cognition, at least not in the Western sense in which 
modern normative epistemology eschews naturalist explanations. This understand-
ing of  epistemology as cognitive theory is most clearly illustrated in Dign ā ga ’ s formula-
tion of  the method of  reasoning known as the triple inferential mark ( trair ū pya ), which 
relies on empirical observation as the most authentic criterion for establishing the valid-
ity of  inferential cognitions. 
 What interests us here is not Dign ā ga ’ s method or its theoretical underpinnings, but 
the specifi c way in which he conceives of  the relation between reason and experience. 
For Dign ā ga (and all subsequent Buddhist epistemologists), cognition operates in two 
distinct domains: that of  particulars, which are only available to empirical awareness, 
and that of  universals, which can only form an object of  inferential reasoning:
 The sources of  knowledge are perception and inference, because the object of  cognition 
has only two characteristics. There is no object of  cognition other than the particular 
characteristic and the universal characteristic, because perception has as its object the 
particular and inference the universal characteristic of  the thing. 
 ( Collection on the Sources of  Knowledge ( Pram āṇ asamuccaya ), 
I. 1; in Hattori  1968 ) 
 First, unlike N ā g ā rjuna and his Madhyamaka followers, Dign ā ga is quite categorical 
in his assertion that  there are reliable sources of  knowledge. Furthermore, by offering 
a phenomenological (thus descriptive) account of  cognition, Dign ā ga makes obvious 
christian coseru
252
that these two sources of  knowledge (roughly equivalent to experience and the exer-
cise of  reason) are distinguished not only on the basis of  the sort of  objects they intend 
but also in terms of  their functional role (cf. Dreyfus  1997 , 49). In other words, 
perception apprehends real individuals by virtue of  its constitution (its cognitive 
architecture and organization: seeing occurs only in organisms endowed with a visual 
system), whereas inference can apprehend only what are essentially conceptual 
constructs. This co-presence of  perception and object  as perceived explains why only 
perception can enter in a direct causal–cognitive coupling with phenomena in the 
empirical domain. 
 Thus, the Buddhist epistemologist comes to regard conception as a secondary, rather 
than a higher-order cognition: the chasm between the world  as experienced and its con-
ceptual apprehension can only be bridged in cognitive events that are pragmatically 
effi cacious. What makes such pragmatic cognitive events “indubitable” is precisely their 
effi cacy, the fact that they attain their object. If  the Buddhist epistemologists come 
to conceive of  the relation between reason and experience in context-specifi c terms, 
then their epistemology may well be described as a system of  pragmatic or context-
dependent reasoning. Unlike the deductive systems of  semantic reasoning, which are 
context-free, pragmatic reasoning is generally inductive and encompasses the types of  
logic (non-monotonic and paraconsistent) that represent reasoning from premises that 
are context specifi c (cf. Bell  2001 ). On this model of  pragmatic reasoning, we reason 
by fi rst observing the occurrence of  certain properties in an object or class of  objects 
and the non-occurrence of  those same properties when the object is absent. This model 
of  reasoning operates by deriving hypothetical statements from past observations of  
the inductive domain. Take the example of  empirical objects: these are understood to 
come into existence due to causes and conditions, and thus to be impermanent, for 
whatever is produced must necessarily cease. Conversely, a permanent object cannot 
be produced. Propositions of  the type “Sound is impermanent, because it is a product,” 
are then true so long as we do not come across an example of  permanent (or indestruct-
ible) sounds. Shoryu Katsura has defi ned this type of  logic as “hypothetical reasoning 
based on induction” (Katsura  2007 , 76). Assuming this system of  reasoning, which is 
based on the observation and non-observation of  evidence, is open to revision so as to 
accommodate cases where there is a violation of  the linguistic convention, we may 
describe it as a system of  context-specifi c reasoning. 
 Such appeals to empirical observation tie logical reasoning to the ability to establish 
causal connections between the things we directly experience. Consequently, exploring 
the limits of  our ability to establish various causal connections between the elements 
of  experience has less to do with principles of  logical entailment and more with psy-
chological inquiries into the nature of  our perceptual and cognitive systems. 
 Thus, Dharmak ī rti ’ s attempt to ground reasoning on a stronger principle than mere 
observation and non-observation of  the evidence would lead him to postulate that 
there must be some “natural connection” ( svabh ā vapratibandha ) between the thesis and 
what is to be demonstrated in order to provide a stronger basis for reasoning. This 
essential connection is meant to overcome the challenge posed by reliance on hypo-
thetical reasoning. However, since Dharmak ī rti ’ s ultimate criterion for truth is the 
causal effi cacy of  cognitions, this essential relation cannot be viewed as pragmatically 
neutral. Reasoning from the empirical data, so the argument goes, must be grounded 
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on more than the simple observation and non-observation of  occurring associations 
and dissociations. In Dharmak ī rti ’ s technical vocabulary, the notions of  identity 
(tā d ā tmya ) and causal generation ( tadutpatti ) thus come to represent two essential con-
ditions on the basis of  which we distinguish between theories of  meaning and theories 
of  reference. Whereas the truth of  the former is contingent upon the semantic content 
of  the sentence, the truth of  the latter requires additional empirical knowledge of  the 
causal relation that obtains between the designated objects (cf. Hayes  1988 , 254; 
Arnold  2008 , 421). 
 In order to establish the sort of  evidence that can serve as a warrant for sound infer-
ence (and to rule out instances of  erratic attribution of  an essential connection between 
premises in an argument), Dharmak ī rti provides various examples of  things that are 
ordinarily thought of  in conjunction: the act of  speaking and passion, a living body 
and breathing, perceptual awareness and the senses, and the stock example of  fi re and 
smoke. 
 But this mode of  understanding pragmatic reasoning must explain what sort 
of  properties, whether observed or unobserved, in similar or dissimilar cases, can be 
counted as evidence for asserting a given thesis? Furthermore, it must also explain 
how such properties are ascertained. In the case of  the act of  speaking and passion, 
for instance, observation of  their occurring association is just a case of  erratic evidence, 
for at most the act of  speaking can serve as ground for inferring the presence of  a 
speech organ and a capacity to communicate, not of  passion. In this example, we see 
Dharmak ī rti indirectly rejecting the notion that speech requires passion – seen as an 
affl iction – for its cause. Obviously, in delivering speeches, buddhas cannot be seen to 
act from passion or impulse (conditions that affl ict only the unenlightened). 
 Given that observation of  one occurring relation does not guarantee the same rela-
tion will obtain at a different place and time, how can one escape the risk that there 
may be unobserved instances to the contrary? For Dharmak ī rti, appeal to rules of  rea-
soning that best refl ect the nature of  causally effi cient entities (that is, to the so-called 
natural relation between the properties of  an inference) offers the best solution to this 
conundrum. As he explains, one cannot infer from a cause to its effect, or from a causal 
totality ( kā ra ṇ as ā magr ī ) to an effect, because there is always the chance of  impending 
factors preventing the arising of  the given effect. One can infer, however, from the effect 
to the cause, though only in a restricted case. Thus, “only an immediate effect enables 
the inference of  a cause, because it is dependent on it” ( Auto-Commentary to  Commen-
tary on the Sources of  Knowledge ( Pram āṇ av ā rttika-svav ṛ tti ), II 12.4; In Pandeya  1989 ). 
In this effort to tie reason to causal explanation (and thus view reasons as causes of  a 
certain type), we see the Buddhist epistemologist ’ s concern with maximizing our pre-
dictive capacity to make sound inferences, the ultimate goal of  which is achieving 
desired ends. 
 We have now come full circle in our account of  how specifi c concerns with identify-
ing and formulating principles of  reason come to inform the Buddhist epistemological 
relation between reason and experience. What does it mean, then, to say that there is 
a natural relation between the properties of  an inference, or that the truth of  the major 
premise can be known by perception? It is to put forth a particular view of  perception 
– one that regards empirical awareness as a form of  embodied action. To perceive is to 
understand how we cope with the environment we inhabit. 
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 Conclusion: Knowledge as Enactive Transformation 
 All Indian Buddhist philosophers argue in one way or another for preserving the 
canonical teachings as conveying a vision of  reality that requires constant actuali-
zation through a dynamic praxis of  interpretation and enactment. This praxis is 
essentially epistemic in character, marking a gradual progression from the act of  listen-
ing to, and refl ecting upon, a set of  statements, to actualizing their signifi cance in an 
enactive manner. Such dynamic integration of  disciplined observation and rational 
deliberation provides both a pragmatic context and the phenomenological orientation 
necessary in order to map out the cognitive domain. It is this praxis that leads a rep-
resentative thinker such as Dharmak ī rti to claim that the Buddha, whose view he and 
his successors claim to propound, is a true embodiment of  the sources of  knowledge. 
Thus, far from seeing a tension between empirical scrutiny and the exercise of  reason, 
the Buddhist epistemological enterprise positions itself  not merely as a dialogical-
disputational method for avoiding unwarranted beliefs, but as a practice aimed at 
achieving concrete, pragmatic ends. As Dharmak ī rti reminds his fellow Buddhists, the 
successful accomplishment of  any human goal is wholly dependent on having correct 
knowledge. 
 Appealing to the Buddha ’ s extraordinary cognitive abilities, therefore, is a case not 
of  the abdication of  reason in the face of  authority, but of  showcasing the embodied 
and enactive character of  enlightened knowledge. Against the dialectical method of  
Nā  g ā  rjuna, whose ultimate aim is the relinquishing of  all views, the Buddhist episte-
mologists emphasize the critical and positive role of  perspicacious reasoning. Indeed, 
with Dign ā  ga, Dharmak ī rti, and their successors, epistemology comes to be regarded 
as an effective discipline that brings about real results. This is a new epistemology, one 
that is constrained by the phenomenology of  fi rst-person experience rather than by  a
priori notions about the operations of  reason or metaphysical assumptions about the 
nature of  reality. 
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